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Abstract
Financial stability, with an emphasis on the relevance of asset prices stability to the stability
of the overall economy, has become the subject of wide discussion among monetary authorities.
Closely related to these issues are the concerns of central bankers with a bubble economy and
its aftermath. After brie‡y surveying the potential links between …nancial markets and the real
economy and its implications for the design of monetary policy, we illustrate some of the issues
in this literature through the analysis of a simple linear rational expectations model. From this
exercise we conclude that the bene…ts of reacting to asset prices depend crucially on the kind
of shock hitting the economy. Ideally, reacting to the misalignment of equity prices is desirable.
However, the presence of uncertainty in the estimation of the variables to which the policy rule
responds may overturn this conclusion.
“The U.S. slipped into recession in mid-1929 because of tight domestic monetary policy aimed at
stemming speculation on the U.S. stock market. The Great Depression started in earnest when
the stock market crash in the U.S. caused consumers and …rms to become nervous and therefore
to stop buying irreversible durable goods.” (Romer: 1993)
Keywords: Asset Prices, In‡ation Targeting, Taylor Rule, Rational Expectations, Uncertainty.
JEL Classi…cation: E17; E52; E61; F42.
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1.Introduction
With in‡ation stabilised in almost all industrialised countries - see, for example, Cecchetti and
Krause (2001)1 - central banks have moved their attention to …nancial markets and its institu-
tions.2 Several factors can explain why …nancial markets have become so important for monetary
policymakers. First, the extraordinary development of …nancial markets since the beginning of the
80s which was accompanied by an increasing importance of stock markets as a share of families’
wealth in developed countries. To this development have contributed importantly the deregulation
and privatisation since the beginning of the 80s (see, for example, Shiller: 2000). Second, the world
increasing economic interdependence, due to the globalisation of …nancial markets, contributed to
increasing uncertainty and higher asset markets volatility (see, for example, Krugman: 2000, and,
on the latter aspect, Borio, Kennedy and Prouse: 1994). Goodhart (2000), however, associates
the increasing volatility of …nancial markets with …nancial market deregulation and liberalisation.
Last but not least, the recovery in last decades of a trend in economic research that goes back to
the 30s, with Irving Fisher’s ideas on the Great Depression, that places …nancial markets at the
centre of business cycles explanations and highlights their relevance in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy.
The Japanese recession in the 90s, the US 1991 crisis, the East Asia crisis of 1998, and
the discussion about the potentially damaging e¤ects of a possible bubble economy in the USA
during the 90s have certainly contributed decisively to the attention devoted to the association of
movements in the real economic activity and in …nancial markets.
Closely related to these developments are the recent concerns of central bankers about what
to do in the presence of asset price volatility and, in the more extreme cases, of a bubble economy
and in the aftermath of a bubble burst. These events have motivated several comments, among
which is the widely cited Alan Greenspan’s 1996 speech. There the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve mentioned the importance of asset price stability to the stability of the overall economy,
and, after mentioning the case of the Japanese economy, questioned when should central bankers
be concerned about irrational exuberance in asset prices. Those remarks synthesise two problems
often present in monetary policy discussions. First, facing some sort of “irrational exuberance” in
the stock market should the central bank intervene? The answer to this question depends in part
on the answer to a second question: what are the e¤ects of the developments in the stock market
on the real economy?
1 Cecchetti and Krause (2001) provide evidence of an improvement in macroeconomic perfor-
mance over 23 countries, in the last two decades, measured as an index of output and in‡ation
volatility.
2 In Mark Gertler’s (Gertler et al.: 1998) words, “the issue of …nancial stability has become one
of the most discussed issues among monetary authorities.”
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In section 2 we brie‡y survey the potential links between …nancial markets, with a special
emphasis on equity prices, and the real economy and its implications to the monetary transmission
mechanism. In section 3 we discuss di¤erent monetary policy approaches to deal with asset price
volatility. In section 4 we employ an exploratory rational expectations model to examine the
more speci…c issues of how equity prices may relate to output and in‡ation and the appropriate
response of monetary policy to equity prices. We discuss how uncertainty in the estimation of
misalignments may change the desirability of reacting to equity prices. Section 5 concludes.
2.The channels by which asset prices impinge on the real
economy
Traditionally, theories of the monetary transmission mechanism have stressed the direct e¤ects of
interest rates and exchange rates on output, and then, indirectly, on in‡ation. However, an old
tradition in macroeconomics that focused on the importance of …nancial markets in the transmis-
sion of the monetary policy has recently been recovered. This renewed interest results basically
from the belief of policymakers and theorists in the existence of causal links between movements
in …nancial markets and output ‡uctuations. From this emerges their relevance for the making
of monetary policy. Furthermore, recall that monetary policy is implemented through …nancial
markets.3 We begin our exposition of these issues start by describing the links between …nancial
markets and the real economy and their implications for the monetary transmission mechanism.4
We then examine the relevance of equities for real macroeconomic outcomes in contemporary
developed economies.
2.1.Financial markets, the real economy and the transmission
mechanism
To …nd a reference to the links between …nancial markets and the behaviour of economic activity
we can go as far back as the 30s, during the Great Depression. At that time several economists,
notably Irving Fisher, considered over-indebtedness and the resulting crisis in the …nancial system
as the main cause of the contraction in output.5 Although Keynes stressed the importance of
…nancial markets for real activity, namely in the determination of investment, his followers centred
their attention on the role of interest rates in the transmission of monetary policy to the real
3 As Blinder (1997) remarks “Monetary policy works through …nancial markets, so perceptions
of likely market reactions must be relevant to policy formulation and actual market reactions must
be relevant to the timing and magnitude of monetary policy e¤ects.”
4 Gertler (1988) has a nice description of the role …nancial markets have had in the explanation
of output ‡uctuations.
5 His debt-de‡ation theory of great depressions, presented in Fisher (1933), works as follows:
over-indebtedness of …rms, created by “new opportunities to invest at a big prospective pro…t”
and “easy money” , leading to liquidation, results in a contraction of …rms’ activity and de‡ation;
the decrease in the price level increases the real debt burden of …rms and precipitates bankruptcies
with the consequent decrease of output and in the price level, trapping the economy in a recession.
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economy. Thereafter, with a few marginal exceptions, notably Gurley and Shaw (1955), the role
of …nancial markets was for long forgotten in mainstream macroeconomics, either in its neoclassical
or in its Keynesian form. As Bernanke (1993) put it, “in the standard model, factors such as the
…nancial conditions of banks and …rms play no role in a¤ecting investment or other types of
spending.”
Behind that view was the paradigm of perfect information and complete markets. In such
a world the role of the …nancial system is almost inexistent, as one of the most in‡uential re-
sults in this literature shows: the Miller-Modigliani irrelevance theorem. Modigliani and Miller
(1958) showed the irrelevance of the …rms’ …nancial structure under the assumption of competitive
markets and perfect information.
However, developments in the economics of imperfect information in the 70s, notably with
Akerlof (1970), challenged the results of the complete markets literature and allowed a new un-
derstanding of the functioning of credit markets, namely of the crucial role of banks and other
…nancial intermediaries. The imperfect and asymmetric information that characterise …nancial
markets will determine the borrower-lender relationship and the …nancial structure of …rms. For
example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) concluded that with imperfect information and incentive
problems external …nance is more expensive than internal …nance. Thus …rms that base their
investment projects on external …nance will be willing to invest less than …rms that do not.
The key role of imperfect information in the relationship between borrowers and lenders is
that it makes it costly for banks to obtain information on …rms’ projects. These capital market
imperfections result in an ine¢cient allocation of funds in credit markets and in a sub-optimal
investment level in the economy. That is, if due, for example, to agency costs external …nance is
more costly than internal …nance - that is, we have an external …nance premium - then investment
demand must depend on the …rm’s balance sheet position and the Modigliani-Miller theorem does
not hold anymore. The higher the agency costs the less e¢cient will be the allocation of funds
in credit markets and the lower will be the investment in the economy. Therefore, Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) argue that the level of investment depends positively on the …rms’ balance sheet
position: a higher net worth or cash ‡ow has a positive e¤ect on investment directly, because it
increases the sources of internal …nance, and indirectly because it reduces the external costs of
…nancing, by o¤ering more collateral - see also Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Because agency costs
vary counter-cyclically - increasing during recessions and decreasing during expansions - they will
have an ampli…cation e¤ect during the cycle. Bernanke et al. (1996) call this ampli…cation e¤ect
of the cycle the …nancial accelerator mechanism.
All these developments have contributed to put the emphasis on the role of credit market
imperfections and …nancial markets in general when explaining economic ‡uctuations. Some
authors - like Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) - focused on the importance of …nancial factors
in the Great Depression and both concluded on the signi…cant role of the collapse of the …nancial
system in causing and reinforcing the deep economic crisis of the 30s. Bernanke’s paper recovers
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Irving Fisher’s idea that the Great Depression was mainly a …nancial crisis and provided some
evidence of the role of non-monetary factors, in contrast with the, until then prevalent, analysis of
Friedman and Schwartz (1963).6 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that this framework has also
been very useful in understanding several other historical and contemporaneous episodes, more
notably the behaviour of the Japanese economy in the 90s.
Another very important in‡uence of the developments described above was on the way
economists and policymakers see the e¤ects of monetary policy and the role of …nancial markets
in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. According to this view, imperfections
in capital markets result in a new channel for monetary policy. This “new” channel for monetary
policy is usually known as the credit channel. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995) the
“credit channel” should be seen as a set of factors that “amplify and propagate conventional
interest rate e¤ects,” and can be decomposed into a balance sheet and a bank-lending channel.
The balance sheet channel captures the potential impact of monetary policy decisions on
…rms’ balance sheets and therefore on its investment ability (Bernanke and Gertler: 1995). For
example, a rise in interest rates that lowers asset prices reduces the market value of borrowers’
collateral. This reduction in value may force some …rms to reduce investment spending as their
ability to borrow declines. From this results an additional impact of monetary policy on the
real economy: because agency costs vary counter-cyclically, an increase in interest rates with
the resulting contraction in economic activity helps to deteriorate balance sheets, raising agency
costs and therefore constraining …rms’ investment capacity. This endogenous change in borrowers’
balance sheets and its e¤ect on economic activity constitutes the …nancial accelerator mechanism
mentioned above. Bernanke et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence supporting the relevance of
the balance sheet channel.
The second, the bank lending channel, captures the e¤ect of monetary policy on banks’
ability to lend and thus on the funds available for …rms’ investment. Kashyap and Stein (1994)
provide empirical evidence on the importance of the bank-lending channel.
Because nowadays equity has an increasing weight on the balance sheet position of …rms
and because of high asset price volatility, we will now concentrate on the importance of stock
markets to the real economy.
2.2.How equity prices impinge on the real economy
Highlighting the relation between equity prices and the real economy, Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
mention that the bust part of the asset price cycle was in many cases associated with contractions
in the real economy. Although it is very di¢cult to obtain accurate estimates of the e¤ects of
changes in asset prices on the real economy, there is some historical evidence that large asset
6 The strong correlation between money and output, speci…cally between 1929 and 1933, found
in Friedman and Schwartz’s work stressed the importance of money in the explanation of cycles
and dwarfed the role of other …nancial factors.
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prices movements can have important e¤ects on the economy. As argued by Bernanke and Gertler
(2001), “asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic ‡uctuations in
both industrial and developing countries.” The same assertion can be found in Cecchetti et al.
(2000), who stress as examples of this relation the cases of the Great Depression and Japan in the
90s.7
We now brie‡y describe the channels by which equity price movements impinge on the real
economy. The three most likely channels are the households’ wealth e¤ect, Tobin’s q e¤ects and
the …rms’ balance sheet channel.
The relevance of the wealth channel has been increasingly referred to as one of the main ve-
hicles transmitting changes in asset markets to real economic activity. The wealth e¤ect describes
the in‡uence of asset prices (mainly stock prices) on households’ wealth and then on aggregate
consumption. The increasing number of families that own shares in developed countries - more
than 50% of the families in the United States own stocks, a percentage that is even greater in
Australia; and even in a country like Germany, where unions are still very important, more than
20% of the families own stocks - have made the role of this channel increasingly important through
its impact on the households’ wealth (see, for example, Shiller: 2000). Despite the conclusions
concerning the e¤ects of the stock market crash on consumption during the Great Depression
(more evidence on the same e¤ect is provided by Temin: 1976), recent empirical studies have
not found a strong or reliable relation between stock market and consumption - see, for example,
Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) and Campbell (1999).
An additional demand-diminishing e¤ect of a stock market crash is the one described by
Christina Romer (1993). According to this author, the extraordinary drop in consumption during
the Great Depression is partly explained by the uncertainty about future incomes due to the stock
market crash. In Romer (1990), the same author used regression analysis to provide evidence of
the role of the stock market crash in explaining the decrease in consumer purchases of durable
goods.
Another channel linking equity prices and real economic activity works through the relative
value of …rms’ capital to its replacement cost, that is, Tobin’s q. An increase (decrease) in equity
prices increases (decreases) the value of capital relative to its replacement cost and thus stimulates
(inhibits) investment demand by …rms. A related issue is the e¤ect of overvaluation of stocks on
investment decisions by …rms. This issue is analysed empirically in Blanchard et al. (1993). In
their regression analysis using time series for the period 1900-1990, these authors concluded that,
although market valuations appear to have a role in the determination of investment decisions,
it is a limited one. However, when commenting on the potential e¤ects of the increase in stock
prices during the last decade, Blanchard (2000) says that empirical evidence suggests that …rms
with overvalued stocks may increase investment beyond what is justi…ed by fundamentals, the
7 As Christina Romer (1993) wrote, “The most likely source of the precipitous drop in American
consumption following the stock market crash in 1929 is the crash itself.”
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result being an excess of capital accumulation. This same link between equity prices and the real
economy is stressed by William Poole (2001). Poole o¤ers the example of the dotcom industry
(and the extraordinary increase in its stocks - between December 1990 and March 2000, the
Nasdaq Telecommunications Index increased approximately 1300 percent) where “the distorted
price signals from the stock market permitted the industry to raise capital easily and cheaply,
which certainly contributed to the overexpansion.”
Besides these direct e¤ects of equity price oscillations on goods and services demand, they
can also have important e¤ects on economic activity through their indirect e¤ects on the …nancial
structure of …rms and on the stability of the …nancial system. Here is a more promising link
between asset prices and the real economy through the above described balance sheet channel
(Bernanke et al.: 1999). As we saw above, capital markets work imperfectly due to information,
incentive and enforcement problems. In such a world the cost of borrowing depends on the …nancial
position of agents and, therefore, a decrease in asset prices reduces the market value of borrowers’
collateral and their ability to borrow and then to invest. These e¤ects can be highly damaging
for the economy in the special case when a bubble in asset prices bursts, as the experiences of
the Great Depression and in Japan in the 90s seem to suggest. In this context, Kent and Lowe
(1997) stress that movements in asset prices, by disturbing the process of …nancial intermediation,
may result in an asymmetric e¤ect: declines in asset prices may have stronger e¤ects on output
and in‡ation. That is, the e¤ects of asset prices movements tend to be more conspicuous when
asset prices fall than when they increase; as we will see this e¤ect once proven to exist may have
substantial implications in the de…nition of monetary policy.
3.Monetary policy and asset prices
The already mentioned 1996 speech of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan,
where he alluded to the irrational exuberance in the American stock market, is the most cited
remark on policymakers’ concerns with movements in the stock market. As the quotation of
Christina Romer at the beginning of this paper suggests, the issue of the appropriate reaction to
movements in the stock markets is discussed and has in‡uenced monetary policy at least since
the 20s and the Great Depression that followed.8 Actually, one of the most famous examples of
those actions was the monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve, in 1928, aiming to prevent the
development of a bubble in the American stock market.9
However, for the reasons mentioned above, the potential e¤ects of stock markets on the real
8 This exceptional period of the American economy still motivates a great deal of research.
Among the reasons for that interest is certainly the remarkable movements in the stock market:
the 20s were a period of euphoria in capital markets only surpassed by the exuberance of the 90s.
For a very interesting description of the similarities between these two “eras” see Shiller (2000).
9 Hamilton (1987), an important paper on monetary policy in this period, concludes that “the
major factor in‡uencing monetary policy during 1928-29 was surely the stock market”
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economy are nowadays certainly more acute: increasing integration of national …nancial markets
and a strengthening of links with real economic activity have reinforced the concerns of monetary
policymakers with movements in equity prices. Thus, several studies have discussed whether asset
prices should be taken into account in the formulation of monetary policy. There is wide agreement,
among both economists and central bankers, that that should be case - see, for example, Greenspan
(1996), Gertler et al. (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Goodhart and
Hofmann (2000), among others.10 However, there is disagreement on the exact role asset prices
should play in the design of monetary policy and how they should be used in practice. Some
authors defend that policymakers should target a broader price index that includes asset prices
(for a discussion of this view see Goodhart: 1999); others argue that they should only be used in
in‡ation forecasts (Bernanke and Gertler: 1999); and others believe that asset prices should be
taken into account in everyday monetary decisions, with policymakers aiming at stabilising their
value around fundamentals (Cecchetti et al.: 2000). We brie‡y discuss next the arguments of the
…rst two approaches. Then we concentrate our attention on the last issue of wether or not central
banks should react to equity prices.
Alchian and Klein (1973) suggested that the traditional Consumer Price Index (CPI) aimed
at measuring household’s purchasing power, and the target of monetary policy, should include asset
prices. Their argument was based on the idea that the purchasing power of households depends
not only on current prices of consumption but also on future prices. Since asset prices can be
seen as a measure of future prices they should therefore be included in the construction of price
indexes.11 Charles Goodhart has been one of the supporters of the replacement of traditional
price indexes targets, like the Consumer Price Index, with a broader measure of the price level
that includes housing and stock prices with an appropriate weight.
The same author also argues for the inclusion of asset prices in the price index to be
targeted by the monetary authority based on the idea that asset prices contribute to improve
in‡ation forecasts. Thus, an increase in asset prices could imply an increase in interest rates even
when conventionally measured in‡ation remains unchanged. This practice could then result in
a better macroeconomic performance, so the argument goes. However, as we discuss below, the
predictive power of asset prices is subject to discussion. Additionally, changes in asset prices
can give wrong indications about future in‡ation given its high volatility and the variety of its
possible origins (Filardo: 2000). Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue that the problems associated with
its implementation make the construction of such an index unpractical. Vickers (1999) shares the
same view.
This interest in the role of asset prices to build in‡ation forecasts was also strengthened by
10 According to a study by the Centre for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England,
mentioned in Cecchetti et al (2000), asset prices in‡uence monetary policy in most of the countries
questioned.
11 Shibuya (1992) shows that their proposed measure of in‡ation can be written as a weighted
sum of a traditional measure of in‡ation and asset price in‡ation.
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the fact that a great number of developed and developing countries are now in‡ation targeters
that have made in‡ation forecasts a crucial instrument in policymakers’ actions. An example of
information conveyed by asset prices is the information on in‡ation expectations.
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) analysed the explanatory power of asset prices through
the estimation of equations for CPI in‡ation for seventeen countries and concluded that equity
prices are a “relatively limited predictor of future in‡ation.” However, they concluded that house
prices could help forecast in‡ation. Filardo (2000) also concludes on the bene…ts of considering
housing price in‡ation in the prediction of future consumer price in‡ation, although “the marginal
improvement in forecasting accuracy is fairly small.” Cecchetti et al. (2000) stress the fact that
the role of asset prices in in‡ation forecasts depend crucially on the importance of the di¤erent
channels by which asset prices impinge on the real economy. For instance, the exchange rate will
certainly have a more important role as an input of in‡ation forecasts in small-open economies
- as it happens at the Bank of England - than in a large closed-economy like the United States
(Cecchetti et al.: 2000). Poole (2001) argues that, in the special case of stock markets, its
information is more useful as a supplement of information from other sources.
In the next section we focus at length on the last and more controversial issue of whether,
in order to improve macroeconomic performance, monetary policy should react directly to asset
prices. We discuss di¤erent points of view on this issue and we illustrate some of them by means
of an exploratory model.
4.Should Monetary Policy React to Equity Prices?
Given that there are reasons to suspect that monetary policy can have important e¤ects on …-
nancial markets and that asset price volatility may be damaging, one may ask whether monetary
policy should react to asset prices. However, the arguments mentioned in the previous section
are not the only arguments sustaining the desirability of reacting to asset prices. Another argu-
ment, following Poole’s (1970) analysis, is that monetary policy should “lean against the wind” of
signi…cant asset price movements if these disturbances originate in the asset markets themselves
(Cecchetti et al.: 2000). In this section we illustrate and discuss this argument by means of a sim-
pli…ed macro-model. The full model comprises a system of equations describing the key aspects of
the macroeconomy, a loss function re‡ecting the preferences of the central bank, and a monetary
policy rule. Smets (1997) has used a model that is similar in some regards.
Our stylized system of macroeconomic equations is the following:
yt = ®1:Etyt+1 +®2:At¡1 ¡ ®3:rt¡1 + "dt (4.1)
¼t = ¯1:¼t¡1 + (1 ¡¯1) :Et¼t+1 + ¯2:yt ¡ "st (4.2)
At = °1:
¡
yt + "
sp + "stut + "
sta
t¡1
¢
+ °2:EtAt+1 ¡ rt + "et (4.3)
Ft = °1:
¡
yt + "
sp + "stut + "
sta
t¡1
¢
+ °2:EtFt+1 ¡ rt (4.4)
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"st = "
sp
t + "
stu
t + "
sta
t¡1 (4.5)
"spt = ½:"
sp
t¡1 + "
spa
t¡1 + "
spu
t (4.6)
The variables are intended to represent percent deviations around the steady state. Equa-
tion (1) depicts a simpli…ed aggregate demand equation that includes a leading term for output
capturing the e¤ects of expected income on today’s spending (Etyt+1).12 Output also depends
negatively on the real interest rate (r) with one lag. Aggregate demand incorporates a wealth ef-
fect, either through consumption or investment, resulting from asset price movements as described
in section 2.2, through the inclusion of the lagged term At¡1.
Equation (2) is a Phillips curve including expected and lagged in‡ation on the right-hand
side as in the New Keynesian form.13 Additionally, in‡ation depends on the output gap with a
lag.
Equation (3) is based on a standard dividend model of asset pricing: it gives equity prices
as a function of next period dividends (assumed to depend on current output and productivity
shocks), other expected future dividends (incorporated in the expected equity price, EtAt+1), and
the interest rate. The coe¢cient on EtAt+1 is the inverse of the gross risk-adjusted rate of interest,
assumed to be approximately 3% following Bernanke et al. (1999). We add a disturbance ("e)
that may, for instance, represent an equity premium shock as mentioned in Cecchetti et al. (2000).
We will interpret this as a non-fundamental shock. An equity premium shock could be justi…ed
by a change in the risk level of equity holdings or in shareholders’ preferences. In our model
these changes do not occur, and thus equity shocks will be seen as the source of misalignments.
Equation (4) gives the fundamental value of equities. It is the same as equation (3), except for
the omission of the non-fundamental equity premium shock.
Notice that, although there are misalignments, there are not “bubbles” (in the usual math-
ematical sense) in our model. Thus, the model will not address the issue of whether central banks
should react to asset prices in order to prevent the development of bubbles. A model that pre-
tends to study that issue must treat bubbles as endogenous in some way, so that the central banks’
actions may in‡uence their evolution. However, that raises di¢cult technical problems.
Equation (5) de…nes the supply shock as the sum of a persistent component ("sp), an
unanticipated temporary supply shock ("stu), and an anticipated temporary supply shock ("sta).
Equation (6) gives the behaviour of the persistent supply shock. This is assumed to have two com-
ponents: one that is anticipated one period before it occurs ("spa), and one that is unanticipated
("spu). The autoregressive coe¢cient should equal unity, if what we wanted was a permanent
shock. However, that would imply the system to be non-stationary. As we will be interested in
computing variances (in order to compare di¤erent policy rules), we reduced the autoregressive
12 This term was …rst derived by McCallum and Nelson (1999) from a fully optimising general
equlibrium model.
13 The lagged term for in‡ation re‡ects in‡ation persistence, which may result from elements of
backward-lookingness in the wage-setting process (see, for example, Fuher and Moore: 1995).
G.E.M.F.-F.E.U.C. 10
Equity Prices and Monetary Policy Alexandre e Bação
coe¢cient to 0.9. Demand and equity shocks, though not shown, are assumed to have the same
structure as the supply shock.
To this system of equations we add another equation describing the behaviour of the central
bank. We will employ two types of rules:
rt = ¸1:yt + ¸2:¼t + ¸3:A
¤
t (4.7)
rt = ±1:Et:¼t+1 + ±2:A
¤
t (4.8)
Equation (7) is a common monetary policy rule that expresses the real interest rate in terms
of current output and in‡ation deviations - the well-known Taylor Rule, after Taylor (1993) - with
the possible addition of a reaction to asset prices: either to equity prices themselves (A¤t = At)
or to the misalignment in asset prices (A¤t = At ¡ Ft). Later we will discuss the implications of
reacting to one or the other. Equation (8) is an in‡ation-forecast targeting rule, where the interest
rate responds to movements in the expected in‡ation one period-ahead - therefore providing a good
description of in‡ation targeters’ behaviour, as argued in Alexandre et al. (2001) -, and possibly
also to asset prices.14
We assume that the central bank does not observe the shocks that bu¤et the economy.
There is no consensus on most values of the parameters, notably on the degree of in‡ation
persistence. In Table 1 we show the parameter values used in our simulations and their sources.
Two parameters, ®1 and ¯1, are worth of some words. Although adjustment costs that result
in output inertia are observable in the data, we set ®1 = 1, following the theoretical derivation
of McCallum and Nelson (1999). The in‡ation persistence coe¢cient, ¯1, is another parameter
involving high uncertainty (see, for example, Rudebusch: 2000). However, we set ¯1 = 0:9,
implying very high in‡ation persistence.
The values for the parameters in the policy rule will be determined by optimisation of
a loss function, with policymakers minimising the variance of output, in‡ation and the policy
instrument:
Loss Function = V (¼t) +!1:V (yt) + !2:V (rt ¡ rt¡1)
The inclusion of output and in‡ation in the loss function re‡ects the wide agreement that
they represent the most important concerns of policymakers. As several authors argue - see, for
example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Batini and Haldane (1999) - the inclusion of output
and in‡ation in the loss function is common practice among central bankers, even among in‡ation
targeters. The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in the expected loss reduces volatility
of the policy instrument and, in the opinion of Mishkin (1999) and others, re‡ects real concerns
of policymakers, since they are very concerned about …nancial stability.
In our exercise, the same weight is given to the variances of output and in‡ation, with
!1 = 1, and only half of this weight is given to the interest rate volatility term, !2 = 0:5, following
14 In Alexandre et al (2001) there is a more detailed description of the signi…cance and relevance
of each of these policy rules.
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Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2000). The variance-covariance matrix of the
errors is assumed to be the identity matrix.
Table 1: Parameters’ values and sources
Parameter Value Source
®1 1.00 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
®2 0.04 see Bernanke et al. (1999)
®3 0.60 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
¯1 0.90 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
¯2 0.40 see Alexandre et al. (2001)
°1 0.05 see Bernanke et al. (1999)
°2 0.97 see Bernanke et al. (1999)
½sp 0.90 persistent shock
To solve this linear rational expectations model, we employed the Schur decomposition as
described in Soderlind (1999), after writing the model in the Blanchard-Kahn form (see Blanchard
and Kahn, 1980).
4.1.The E¤ects of Shocks
There is a widespread view in the literature that the bene…ts of reacting (or not) to asset price
movements depend crucially on the cause behind its movement. Identifying the source of asset
price movements, namely if they are caused by changes in fundamentals or by changes unrelated
to fundamentals, and its implications for future in‡ation, is required for determining the appro-
priate monetary policy response, as argued by Smets (1997) and Cecchetti et al. (2000), among
others. However, we should stress that this question only makes sense in a world of imperfect
capital markets: in a world of e¢cient capital markets movements in asset prices re‡ect economic
fundamentals and in such a situation the only bene…t of looking at asset prices would be the
information conveyed about the state of the economy.15
Therefore, when asset price movements are driven by non-fundamental factors and a¤ect
the real economy they can then be the cause of economic instability and should, therefore, be taken
into account by policymakers. For example, an increase in equity prices caused by the “irrational
exuberance” of markets and not sustained by improvements in productivity growth that result in
higher pro…ts, is likely to result in in‡ationary pressures and therefore ask for monetary policy
action. The most remarkable instance of non-fundamental movements in asset prices is the case of
a bubble in the stock market, that can be de…ned as “an unsustainable increase in prices brought
on by investors’ buying behaviour rather than by genuine, fundamental information about value”
(Shiller: 2000).
Using our exploratory model we evaluate the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks on the economy and
15 For instance, consider the case of exchange rate movements in Australia where the appreciation
of the dollar, in the beginning of the 90s, was the result of an improvement in the terms of trade: in
this case, as noticed by Smets (1997), there was no need for a monetary easing because the positive
e¤ect of the increase in the terms of trade on in‡ation was counteracted by the appreciation of
the currency.
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the potential bene…ts of reacting to asset prices. In this exercise we try to discern the relevance
for monetary policy of movements in asset prices driven by fundamental and non-fundamental
shocks.
We begin with the Taylor Rule. The optimised values for the coe¢cients in the Taylor rule
are ¸1 = 0:17 and ¸2 = 1:71 (assuming that there is no reaction to asset prices: ¸3 = 0).
We …rst display, using the structure in equations (5) and (6) for all categories of shocks
(demand, supply, and equity), the e¤ect of a unit shock on the variables of our system. In this
context, supply shocks that a¤ect asset prices should be seen as changes in fundamentals, whereas
the equity shock, "etut , should be interpreted as a non-fundamental movement in asset prices.
Table 2: E¤ect in period t with an optimised Taylor rule
with ¸3 = 0 with ¸3 = 0:03
Origin yt ¼t At Ft rt yt ¼t At Ft rt
"dput 1.020 0.454 -7.620 -7.620 0.949 1.118 0.503 -7.450 -7.450 0.825
"dpat 0.470 0.233 -7.792 -7.792 0.477 0.574 0.284 -7.631 -7.613 0.355
"dtut 0.597 0.245 -0.607 -0.607 0.520 0.601 0.247 -0.599 -0.599 0.506
"dtat 0.326 0.158 -0.964 -0.964 0.326 0.335 0.163 -0.948 -0.948 0.306
"sput 2.087 -0.192 2.535 2.535 0.030 2.053 -0.209 2.476 2.476 0.070
"spat 1.295 0.514 1.126 1.126 1.098 1.270 0.502 1.084 1.084 1.105
"stut 0.923 -0.654 1.522 1.522 -0.958 0.910 -0.660 1.500 1.500 -0.925
"stat 0.629 0.192 0.956 0.956 0.435 0.617 0.186 0.934 0.934 0.451
"eput 0.148 0.073 5.420 -2.454 0.150 0.081 0.040 5.303 -2.571 0.241
"epat 0.150 0.074 4.954 -2.684 0.153 0.082 0.040 4.836 -2.802 0.228
"etut 0.013 0.006 0.961 -0.039 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.951 -0.049 0.035
"etat 0.019 0.010 0.888 -0.082 0.020 0.011 0.005 0.872 -0.098 0.037
As discussed in Cecchetti et al. (2000), a persistent unanticipated supply shock results in a
higher asset price and a lower in‡ation. The same is true in the case of a temporary unanticipated
supply shock. However, in the …rst case the change in asset prices is larger, and the change in
in‡ation is smaller. A persistent anticipated supply shock also leads to an increase in asset prices,
but in‡ation also rises. Again, the same is true in the case of a temporary anticipated supply
shock, but the immediate impact is larger in the event of a persistent anticipated supply shock.
Now let us compare the results obtained above, when the policy rule does not react to asset
prices, to the ones obtained when the policy rule does react to the actual asset prices. We assume
¸3 = 0:03 and A¤t = At.
The e¤ect on the levels of in‡ation and the output gap of reacting to the level of asset
prices depends on the type of shock. The implication is that the desirability of reacting to asset
prices will hinge on the type of shocks that are more likely to a¤ect the economy. If demand
shocks are predominant, then reacting to the asset prices themselves is destabilising, in terms of
both in‡ation and output. Actually, it would be preferable to react with a negative coe¢cient.
In our model, the optimised values of the policy rule would be ¸1 = 0:20, ¸2 = 1:47, ¸3 = ¡0:05.
Obviously, this implies increasing the variance of equity prices, and thus increasing the possibility
of …nancial crises through the mechanisms discussed in section 2.
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If equity premium shocks are predominant, then reacting to equity prices would be stabil-
ising. However, in this model this type of shock has little impact on the variables. This impact
would be larger if the value of ®2 (the wealth e¤ect) were bigger. Values of ®2 above 0:14 would
make the optimised ¸3 positive. As for supply shocks, reacting to equity prices stabilises both
in‡ation and output in the case of anticipated shocks, and stabilises only output in the case of
unanticipated shocks.
Additional research showed that exactly the same patterns would emerge in the case of an
in‡ation-forecast targeting rule as in equation (8). Under this rule, the optimised ±2 would be
positive for values of ®2 larger than 0:07.
The conclusion, as in Cecchetti et al. (2000), is that reacting to asset prices themselves
is not a good idea. The desirability of reacting to equity prices depends on the type of shocks
that disturb the economy. Reacting to equity prices is undoubtedly stabilising if those shocks
represent non-fundamental movements in equity prices. Thus, reacting to misalignments would
have the bene…t of not destabilising (nor would it stabilise) output and in‡ation in the event of
a supply or demand shock. When these shocks occur there is no misalignment and therefore no
adjustment of the interest rate. On the other hand, reacting to misalignments would stabilise
in‡ation and output in the event of an equity premium shock. If a positive equity premium shock
occurs, equity prices will rise above fundamentals, thus causing a misalignment which would call
for a (stabilising) increase of the interest rate.
4.2.Should the Central Bank Aim at Financial Stability? The
Welfare Function
Notwithstanding di¤erent points of view about the uncertainty surrounding the determination of
asset prices equilibrium and other issues raised by reacting to asset prices, described below, there
exists some consensus that monetary policy should not aim at asset price stability. According to
that dominant view, monetary policy should concentrate on goods and services in‡ation. This
view implies that asset prices should not be included in the central banker’s loss function, that
is, policymakers should not be concerned with volatility in asset prices in itself. Therefore, the
argument set forth by Cecchetti et al. (2000) - see section 3 - that central bankers should stabilise
asset prices around fundamentals should be understood as a means to stabilise output and in‡ation.
Even authors like Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler to whom …nancial stability is a crucial condition
for macroeconomic stability - as we saw above - agree that monetary policy should not aim directly
at …nancial stability. We should stress that reacting to asset prices in order to stabilise the economy
and aiming to stabilise the …nancial markets are two di¤erent things.
The variance of in‡ation, output, the interest rate, equity prices and fundamentals under
the di¤erent policy rules were computed as in Alexandre et al. (2001) and are presented in Table
3. The coe¢cients used by each rule are shown in Table 4.
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Table 3: Variances under di¤erent policy rules
Variance Loss
Rule yt ¼t At Ft rt Function
TR 66.11 6.04 1098.64 872.93 15.08 76.37
TR+A 65.61 5.54 1108.98 875.82 15.27 75.12
TR+mis. 65.99 5.90 1094.22 874.07 15.10 75.97
IFT 67.51 2.87 1105.87 882.57 14.99 73.16
IFT+A 67.57 2.79 1108.33 883.25 14.00 73.11
IFT+mis. 67.46 2.85 1103.16 883.10 14.98 73.05
Table 4: Optimised coe¢cients
Rule Coe¢cients
yt ¼t Et¼t+1 At At ¡ Ft
TR 0.17 1.71 - - -
TR+A 0.20 1.47 - -0.05 -
TR+mis. 0.17 1.66 - - 0.04
IFT - - 3.07 - -
IFT+A - - 2.84 -0.02 -
IFT+mis. - - 2.95 - 0.04
From Table 3 we draw two results. First, in‡ation-forecast targeting rules perform better
than Taylor rules in terms of the overall loss. The improvement comes from a reduction in in‡ation
volatility which compensates for an increase in output volatility. The variance of equity prices
tends to be higher under in‡ation-forecast targeting rules, though only slightly. On the contrary,
the variance of the interest rate is slightly lower under in‡ation-forecast targeting rules. This
means that the increase in the volatility of asset prices under an IFT rule comes from the increase
in the uncertainty surrounding dividends, i.e. output. Second, changes in variances resulting from
reacting to equity prices are relatively small. A more important change occurs, in this model,
when we move from a Taylor rule to an in‡ation-forecast targeting rule.
4.3.Uncertainty in the Estimation of Misalignments
An issue closely related to this discussion is the estimation of asset price misalignments from
its fundamentals; a question that is not very well understood as emphasized in Gertler et al.
(1998). Actually, the di¢culties raised by this task have been one of the main arguments against
the reaction to asset prices, notably Bernanke and Gertler (1999). However, supporters of a
more active monetary policy, like Cecchetti et al. (2000), argue that the di¢culty in estimating
asset prices misalignments cannot be used as an argument against reacting to asset prices, as
policymakers always need to estimate misalignments, for example, when we estimate the output
gap or forecast in‡ation. If it were a valid argument, then we could not use it to estimate the output
gap or to forecast in‡ation. On the other side, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue that, although
there are di¢culties in estimating the output gap, the standard deviations in the estimation of
stock prices fundamentals are certainly far higher. Although the di¢culties in estimating asset
prices misalignments are widely acknowledged, there are several examples of overvaluation in stock
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markets that seemed to have generated a general consensus, at least a posteriori : this is the case of
Japan in the end of the eighties and the case of equity prices in the U.S.A. and in most European
countries in the 90s, among others (see, for example, Shiller: 2000).
Initially, we propose to introduce uncertainty in our model by means of adding a random
noise to the “observed” misalignment. That is, policy-makers will react to A¤t = At ¡ Ft + ²t,
where ²t is NID, with variance given by n:V (At ¡Ft). The parameter n is what we will call the
“noise-to-signal ratio.”
In the case of the Taylor rule (TR+mis. in Table 4), a noise-to-signal ratio of about 1=3
would be required for the uncertainty in the misalignment to make it preferable not to react
to misalignments (i.e. employ TR instead). In the case of the in‡ation-forecast targeting rule
(IFT+mis. in Table 4), a noise-to-signal ratio slightly under 1=4 (around 0:23) would be su¢cient
for rule IFT in Table 4 to be preferable.
Now suppose that there is also noise in the values of yt, ¼t and Et¼t+1 observed by the
monetary authority. Assume again that the errors enter additively and are NID with variance
given by n:V (yt), n:V (¼t), and n:V (Et¼t+1), respectively. Thus, we are assuming that the
“noise-to-signal ratio” is the same for all variables. In the case of the Taylor rule, additional
experiments showed that an increase of 0:1 in the noise-to-signal ratio leads to a reduction in
the bene…t of reacting to misalignments approximately equal to 0:005. Given that the bene…t
(di¤erence between the loss function of TR and the loss function of TR+mis. - see Table 3) was
around 0:4 with a zero noise-to-signal ratio, it will be preferable not to react to asset prices when
the noise-to-signal ratio is around 8, which appears to be implausible. As for the in‡ation-forecast
targeting rule, as the noise-to-signal ration increases, the bene…t of reacting to misalignments
actually increases. This might be signalling that the IFT rule is less “robust” to errors than the
IFT+mis. rule.
The analysis in the previous paragraph was conducted under the assumption of zero-
correlation between the measurement errors. However, it has been argued (e.g. Cecchetti et
al.: 2000 - recall the …rst paragraph in this subsection) that if we there are errors in the estima-
tion of misalignments, then there will also be errors in the estimation of the other policy variables.
The implication is that the estimation errors are likely to be correlated. Table 5 shows for di¤er-
ent levels of positive correlation between the errors in the estimation of yt, ¼t and At ¡ Ft the
corresponding level of noise-to-signal ratio that makes the policy-maker indi¤erent between rules
TR and TR+mis. and between rules IFT and IFT+mis..
Table 5: Critical noise-to-signal ratio
Correlation 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
n Taylor R. 0.305 0.155 0.104 0.078 0.063 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.032
Inf. For. R. 0.386 0.139 0.085 0.061 0.048 0.039 0.033 0.029 0.025 0.023
Apparently, a large noise-to-signal ratio is not required to erase the bene…ts of reacting to
misalignments, if there is some degree of positive correlation between the estimation errors. Also,
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when an in‡ation-forecast targeting rule is employed and the correlation is more than 0.1, a lower
noise-to-signal ratio wipes out the bene…ts of reacting to misalignments.
We must stress that these results do not bear on the issue of whether reacting to equity
prices contributes to prevent the emergence of bubbles and, since bubbles that do not come into
being do not burst, thereby reduces macroeconomic instability. What our results show is that
it is possible that the argument that estimation errors cannot be waged against monetary policy
“leaning against the wind” may not be acceptable.
4.4.No bubble busting, please!
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), in their very in‡uential paper, defend that, because price and
…nancial stability are highly complementary and consistent objectives, when policymakers pursue
the former objective they are indirectly contributing to the second. According to this authors,
therefore, a ‡exible in‡ation targeting regime16 is the most adequate monetary strategy to deal
with non-fundamental movements in asset prices. That is, according to this monetary strategy
central banks should adjust their policy instrument whenever expected in‡ation deviates from the
target and monetary policy should, therefore, respond to movements in asset prices only insofar
as they a¤ect expected in‡ation.
According to these authors reacting directly to asset prices raises several di¢culties and,
therefore, there are good reasons for policymakers to concentrate exclusively on price stability, that
is, on both in‡ationary and de‡ationary forces. Besides the di¢culties associated with reacting
to asset prices mentioned above, they argue that a ‡exible in‡ation targeting strategy is the best
monetary policy strategy to deal with volatility in asset prices because it favours macroeconomic
stability and, thus, reduces the potential for …nancial panics. Why are price stability and …nancial
stability consistent and mutually reinforcing objectives and why is a ‡exible in‡ation targeting
strategy the most adequate framework to achieve both objectives?
Supporters of an in‡ation targeting regime claim that this monetary policy framework helps
to stabilise not only in‡ation but the whole macroeconomic environment. This monetary strategy
would not only stabilise prices but also …nancial markets. In the opinion of Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) there are several reasons for this potential double bene…cial e¤ect. First, a low in‡ation
environment is in itself bene…cial for …nancial markets stability. Second, “the central bank’s
easing in the face of asset prices decline should help to insulate balance sheets to some degree,
reducing the economy’s vulnerability to further adverse shocks” (Bernanke and Gertler: 1999).
Third, “if …nancial market participants expect the central bank to behave in this countercyclical
manner, rising interest rates when asset prices increases threaten to overheat the economy and
16 Bernanke et al. (1999) de…ne in‡ation targeting as a monetary policy framework in which
authorities recognise price stability as the overriding goal of its actions and announce an in‡ation
target in accordance. These authors also emphasise as distinguishing features of this regime
the e¤orts to communicate with the public and central bank’s accountability for achieving these
objectives.
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vice versa, it is possible that overreactions in asset prices arising from market psychology and
other non-fundamental forces might be moderated” (Bernanke and Gertler: 1999). Additionally,
an in‡ation target strategy implies that only movements in asset prices that produce in‡ationary
e¤ects motivate a reaction by the policy instrument. To illustrate the harmony between …nancial
and price stability, Gertler, in Gertler et al. (1998), refers to the October 1987 U.S. crash in the
stock market: in that situation, a stable macroeconomic environment allowed the Federal Reserve
to avert a more dramatic …nancial crisis through monetary easing.
However, this reasoning is not without problems. Implicitly the support for an asymmetric
reaction of policy makers can be conveyed with all the potential for moral hazard behaviour on
the part of investors: investors may buy more assets on the expectation that central banks will cut
the interest rates to prevent the market from falling.17 Miller et al. (1999) suggest that this was
actually the behaviour of the Federal Reserve during the 90s and that it contributed to the stock
market climb. However, Alan Greenspan denies the asymmetric character of the Fed monetary
policy: equity prices move asymmetrically not the Fed. They go down very sharply, asking for
very strong monetary policy reactions in order to prevent a …nancial crisis; but they generally go
up very smoothly and slowly.
By the same token, Blinder (1997) alerts to the dangers of central bankers following the
“…nancial market’s lead” that would result from the short term horizon of …nancial markets and
the consequent overreaction of these markets: because …nancial markets are very sensitive to
expectations about what central banks will do, central banks may end doing what markets want.
As Issing refers, in Gertler et al. (1998), this can raise the risk of circularity or the “dog chasing
its tail phenomenon.”18
Another potential problem with this approach, as we have seen, is the key aspect of the
premise of the crucial role of price stability to …nancial stability in the conclusions of Bernanke and
Gertler (1999). If macroeconomic stability is probably the best way to achieve …nancial stability,
as is argued by several authors (see, for example, Gertler et al.: 1998), it also true that price
stability has been mentioned as one of the factors behind stock markets’ irrational exuberance
(Blinder: 1999). Shiller (2000) includes low in‡ation as one of the precipitating factors of the
market climb since 1982 and Kent and Lowe (1997) remark that “While low and stable in‡ation
should reduce the likelihood of an asset-price bubble occurring, it does not guarantee that bubbles
will not occur; the Japanese experience in the late 80s is an obvious example.” These authors
also warn that asset-price bubbles in a low-in‡ation environment may be more damaging for the
economy: since in a low-in‡ation environment falls in nominal asset prices are more likely, …nancial
17 In Gertler et al. (1998), Issing argues that a tendency for central bankers to react asym-
metrically - because increases in equity are welcome and declines are seen as distressing for real
economic activity - can damage central banks’ credibility.
18 The circularity results from the central bank using private sector forecasts which themselves
are based on expected monetary policy. In this case, the anchor that stabilises expectations is
missing.
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institutions run a greater risk of not being able to collect the full collateral value on bad loans.
In short, the main conclusion of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) is “no bubble busting, please.”
Simultaneously, in the presence of an asset price crash they advocate a strong intervention by the
central bank in order to prevent a …nancial crisis that can be highly disruptive for the economic
system. Their rationale comes from the sense of potential non-linearities and asymmetries in asset
price e¤ects on the real economy: declines in asset prices may have stronger e¤ects on output
and in‡ation, suggesting that monetary policy should react more aggressively to declines then to
increases in asset prices (Crockett: 1998). From their simulation exercise, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) conclude that in the presence of an asset price shock a more aggressive reaction of the
policy instrument results in better macroeconomic performance and they also acknowledge that
monetary policy may have an important role in face of asset price volatility: their view of history
is that asset price crashes have damaged the economy only when monetary policy did not react or
instead favoured de‡ationary pressures - in this context they add the important role of an e¢cient
regulatory …nancial system and even adequate …scal policies to increase the public con…dence.19
Shiller (2000), for example, although suggesting that a small increase in interest rates ac-
companied by a public statement that it intends to reduce speculation may be bene…cial, mentions
the cases of the U.S.A. in the 30s and Japan in 1989 as examples of the potentially devastating
e¤ects of a monetary policy response. The action of the Federal Reserve during 1928-30 is also
used in Cogley (1999) to contend that the impossibility of identifying bubbles timely makes any
attempt to stem speculation destabilising. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999), another
reason for not reacting to asset prices is the unpredictable psychology of investors. Yet, in this
context, Goodfriend, in Gertler et al. (1998), questions why equity markets continue to be so
nervous at the prospect of an increase in interest rates.
5.Conclusion
Improvements in macroeconomic performance, in terms of in‡ation and output stabilisation, over
the last decade combined with increasing volatility in asset prices have shifted the attention of
central bankers and theorists to developments in …nancial markets. Among asset prices much
attention has been devoted to equity prices.
Our discussion seems to suggest that the disagreement between opposers and supporters of
reacting to asset prices is more apparent than real. Both sides agree on the dangers of a stock
market crash to the stability of the real economy. The di¤erence between the two views is, in our
opinion, one of degree: Bernanke and Gertler (1999) are more cautious about reacting to asset
price increases given the dangers of generating a …nancial panic; Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Kent
19 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) do not hesitate to praise the 1987 reaction of the Federal Reserve
to the Stock market crash. Similarly, Goodfriend, in Gertler et al. (1998), refuses any systematic
reaction to asset prices, for all the reasons mentioned above, but strongly supports action by
central bankers in order to restore …nancial stability following a crash in the stock market.
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and Lowe (1997) are more venturous. Blanchard (2000), commenting on Bernanke and Gertler
(1999), considers that not reacting to asset prices is a very “attractive” answer: “It is surely an
attractive answer from the point of view of the central bank: having to respond to bubbles is
likely to be unpopular with …nancial investors.”
We conclude that the desirability of reacting to equity prices depends on the type of shocks
disturbing the economy. Although reacting to equity prices would be stabilising if equity premium
shocks are predominant, that would not be the proper policy reaction in the case of demand and
supply shocks. Another conclusion is that in‡ation-forecast targeting rules perform better than
Taylor rules in terms of the central bank loss function and that the bene…ts of reacting to asset
prices are marginal.
In deciding the appropriate answer of monetary policy to asset prices two important issues
arise: the uncertainty in the estimation of asset prices misalignments and estimation of the wealth
e¤ect. Assuming a commonly mentioned value for the wealth e¤ect, our analysis lead to the
conclusion that a small degree of positive correlation between estimation errors is su¢cient to
make reaction to equity prices undesirable at low “noise-to-signal” ratios.
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